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Abstract 
This chapter examines how the national courts in three developing countries (Kenya, South 
Africa, and India) have addressed the tension between patent rights and the right to health in 
some of the cases litigated before them. National courts in developing countries are 
increasingly being confronted with disputes involving tensions between the enforcement of 
patent rights and the enjoyment of the right to health. As a result of the WTO’s Agreement on 
Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, developing countries that are members 
of the WTO are required to provide patent protection for pharmaceutical products. These 
patent rights however create a tension between the rights of pharmaceutical companies that 
own patents on essential drugs and the right to health of poor patients who cannot afford to 
pay for some of these patented drugs. The chapter is structured into three main parts. Part one 
examines the nature of the relationship between patent rights and the right to health while 
part two deals with the justiciability of the right to health in Kenya, South Africa, and India. 
Part three provides an analysis of how the national courts of these three developing countries 
have adjudicated some of the pharmaceutical patent cases involving tensions between the 
right to health and patent rights. 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
The human right to health is accorded recognition in a number of international legal 
instruments and in the basic law of several countries across the world. The recognition of the 
right to health in legal instruments, however, is not a guarantee that it is being enjoyed on an 
equal basis in every country in the world. There are several reasons why several people, 
particularly poor patients living in developing countries, do not enjoy the right to health. One 
contributory factor in this regard is the current global structure for the protection of 
intellectual property rights as embodied in the World Trade Organization’s Agreement on 
Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS Agreement). Patent rights have 
a direct impact on the right to health, especially in developing countries where patented 
pharmaceutical products are usually priced beyond the reach of poor patients. 
One of the international agreements that provides for the right to health is the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR). Article 12(1) of the ICESCR 
mandates the states parties to the Covenant to ‘recognize the right of everyone to the 
enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health’. In 2000, the UN 
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Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (UN CESCR) adopted General 
Comment No. 14 in an attempt to provide further definition for Article 12 of the ICESCR 
(UN CESCR 2000). Paragraph 12 of General Comment No. 14 is very relevant to the 
question of access to medicines. It enumerates four essential, interrelated components of the 
right to health: availability, accessibility, acceptability, and quality. In particular, it provides 
that essential drugs (as defined by the World Health Organization Action Programme on 
Essential Drugs) must be available in a country. 
According to the World Health Organization (WHO), essential drugs are drugs that ‘satisfy 
the priority health care needs of the population’ and ‘are intended to be available within the 
context of functioning health systems at all times in adequate amounts ... and at a price the 
individual and the community can afford’ (WHO 2015). In addition, General Comment No. 
14 states that health care services must be economically accessible to everyone, suggesting 
that the prices of essential drugs should not be so expensive as to be unaffordable for poor 
patients (UN CESCR 2000, para 12(b)). This makes access to essential medicines at an 
affordable price an integral component of the right to health (Hristova 2011, p. 356; UN 
Human Rights Council 2013). 
States have an obligation to respect, protect and fulfil the right to health (UN CESCR 2000, 
para 33). The obligation to respect the right to health demands that states should not interfere 
directly or indirectly with the enjoyment of the right to health (Ibid). Essentially, the 
obligation to respect the right to health requires that states should, inter alia, ‘refrain from 
denying or limiting equal access for all persons … to preventive, curative and palliative 
health services’ (Ibid para 34). The obligation to protect the right to health requires states to, 
inter alia, ‘adopt legislation or to take other measures ensuring equal access to health care 
and health-related services provided by third parties’ (Ibid para 35). The obligation to fulfil 
the right to health demands that states should, inter alia, ‘give sufficient recognition to the 
right to health in the national political and legal systems, preferably by way of legislative 
implementation, and to adopt a national health policy with a detailed plan for realizing the 
right to health’ (Ibid para 36). 
The obligation of states to respect, protect and fulfil the right to health has implications for 
the design, implementation, interpretation and enforcement of their national patent laws. The 
obligation to respect the right to health requires that when designing, implementing, or 
interpreting patent laws, the various arms and organs of government (including the courts) 
should not adopt an approach that interferes directly or indirectly with the enjoyment of the 
right to health. In order to effectively protect the right to health, states should ensure that the 
patent rights owned by third parties such as pharmaceutical companies are not permitted to be 
exercised and enforced in a manner that makes it more difficult for poor citizens to have 
access to affordable generic drugs. The obligation to fulfil the right to health demands that, 
when designing or amending their national patent laws, states should not ignore or overlook 
the possible implications such legislative proposals can have on the realization of the right to 
health. States equally have core obligations with regard to the right to health. One of the core 
obligations of states is to ‘provide essential drugs, as from time to time defined under the 
WHO Action Programme on Essential Drugs’ (Ibid para 43(d)). It must be stressed that this 
core obligation is one from which no derogation is permissible (Ibid para 47). 
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The objective of this chapter is to examine how the national courts in three developing 
countries (Kenya, South Africa, and India) have addressed the tension between patent rights 
on pharmaceutical products and the right to health. The chapter is structured into three main 
parts. Part one examines the nature of the relationship between patent rights and the right to 
health while part two deals with the justiciability of the right to health in Kenya, South 
Africa, and India. Part three provides an analysis of how the national courts of these three 
developing countries have adjudicated some of the pharmaceutical patent cases involving 
tensions between the right to health and patent rights. 
 
1. THE NATURE OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN PATENT RIGHTS 
AND THE RIGHT TO HEALTH  
 
There is a divergence of opinion with regard to how the relationship between patent rights 
and human rights should be conceptualized (Drahos 1999; Helfer 2003; Yu 2007a; Yu 2007b; 
Torremans 2008; Grosheide 2010; Helfer and Austin 2011; Gold 2013; Plomer 2013). In his 
review of the literature, Gold (2013, pp. 186-187) identifies three broad approaches to the 
conceptualization of the relationship between patent rights and human rights: 
1. The ‘subjugation approach,’ which states that when patent rights and human rights 
conflict, human rights considerations should trump patent rights; 
2. The ‘integrated approach,’ which views patents as a human right; and 
3. The ‘coexistence approach,’ which asserts that patent law and human rights law are 
distinct but share a basic concern in defining the optimal amount of patent protection 
required to incentivize and practice socially useful innovation. 
In his description of the ‘subjugation approach’, Helfer (2003, p. 48) notes that this approach 
‘views human rights and intellectual property as being in fundamental conflict’ and it 
considers ‘strong intellectual property protection as undermining – and therefore as 
incompatible with – a broad spectrum of human rights obligations, especially in the area of 
economic, social, and cultural rights’. Helfer further notes that the ‘prescription that 
proponents of this approach advocate for resolving this conflict is to recognize the normative 
primacy of human rights law over intellectual property law in areas where specific treaty 
obligations conflict’ (Ibid). Plomer (2013, p. 151) suggests that this approach ‘might arguably 
be more accurately described as the “primacy of human rights” view’.  
Gold (2013, p. 187-188) describes the ‘integrated approach’ as an approach that assimilates 
‘patent rights into human rights analyses’ instead of ‘introducing human rights considerations 
into patent policy as advocated by some adherents of the subjugation approach’. The 
‘integrated approach’ does not consider patents and human rights as distinct, rather it views 
‘patents as part of human rights law’ (Ibid p. 188). However, as will be demonstrated below, 
advocates of the ‘integrated approach’ typically misconstrue the provisions of international 
human rights instruments such as Article 15(1)(c) of the ICESCR which provides for the 
protection of the moral and material interests of authors and inventors. They build their 
arguments on the false premise that provisions such as Article 15(1)(c) show that intellectual 
property rights (including patent rights) are human rights (Ibid p. 188). 
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Helfer (2003, p. 48) provides a description of the ‘coexistence approach’ as an approach that 
sees both human rights and intellectual property rights ‘as concerned with the same 
fundamental question: defining the appropriate scope of private monopoly power that gives 
authors and inventors a sufficient incentive to create and innovate, while ensuring that the 
consuming public has adequate access to the fruit of their efforts’. Helfer (Ibid) further notes 
that this approach ‘views human rights law and intellectual property law as essentially 
compatible, although often disagreeing over where to strike the balance between incentives 
on the one hand and access on the other’. 
Before identifying the correct one among the three approaches, it is essential to first 
determine the status of intellectual property rights (including patent rights) under 
international human rights law. Article 15(1)(c) of the ICESCR recognizes the right of 
everyone to ‘benefit from the protection of the moral and material interests resulting from any 
scientific, literary or artistic production of which he is the author’. A similar provision is also 
contained in Article 27(2) of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR). Article 
27(2) of the UDHR provides that ‘Everyone has the right to the protection of the moral and 
material interests resulting from any scientific, literary or artistic production of which he is 
the author’. At first reading, these two provisions appear to equate intellectual property rights 
(IPRs) with other types of human rights and this has led some authors such as Millum (2008) 
and Marks (2009) to conclude that they provide a human rights basis for patent rights and 
other forms of IPRs. 
However, the CESCR, in its General Comment No. 17, has made it clear that human rights 
and IPRs are not on the same level, and it will be erroneous to rely on Article 15(1)(c) to 
equate intellectual property rights with human rights (UN CESCR 2005, paras 1 & 3). 
According to the CESCR, Article 15(1)(c) solely ‘safeguards the personal link between 
authors and their creations … as well as their basic material interests which are necessary to 
enable authors to enjoy an adequate standard of living’ while ‘intellectual property regimes 
primarily protect business and corporate interests and investments’ (Ibid para 2). In essence, 
the human right contained in Article 15(1)(c) is not coterminous with intellectual property 
rights. The approach adopted by the CESCR is equally supported by the drafting history of 
both Article 27(2) of the UDHR and Article 15(1)(c) of the ICESCR. It has been noted that 
the provisions were included in both instruments after considerable debates and controversy 
(Yu 2007a, p. 1073). According to Chapman (2001, p. 13), the drafting history of both the 
UDHR and ICESCR supports ‘relatively weak claims of intellectual property as a human 
right’. 
Strictly speaking, the human right contained in both Article 15(1)(c) of the ICESCR and 
Article 27(2) of the UDHR is a right to the protection of the ‘moral and material interests’ of 
authors and inventors in their creative works. This right is separate from, and should never be 
confused with, intellectual property rights. The CESCR, in General Comment No. 17, 
stresses the point that the protection of the moral and material interests of authors and 
inventors does not necessarily coincide with what is currently regarded as intellectual 
property right in national laws and international agreements (UN CESCR 2005, para 2). 
While the right to the protection of the moral interests and material interests of authors and 
inventors in their creative works is a fundamental entitlement, intellectual property rights are 
not fundamental entitlements as they can be limited, traded, amended or even forfeited (Ibid). 
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With regard to the scope of the right to the protection of the moral interests of authors and 
inventors in their works, the CESCR notes that it includes ‘the right of authors to be 
recognized as the creators of their scientific, literary and artistic productions and to object to 
any distortion, mutilation or other modification of, or other derogatory action in relation to, 
such productions, which would be prejudicial to their honour and reputation’ (Ibid para 13). 
In other words, the right to the protection of the moral interests of authors and inventors is 
akin to the protection of moral rights contained in the copyright laws of countries such as 
Germany and France (Yu 2007a, pp. 1081-1082). The moral rights of authors should however 
not be confused with copyright (Drahos 1998, pp.13-14). One can thus infer from this that 
moral rights (as distinct from copyright) enjoy the status of human rights. 
In distinguishing between the ‘moral interests’ of authors and inventors and the ‘material 
interests’ of authors and inventors, the CESCR in General Comment No. 17 notes that 
‘Unlike other human rights, the material interests of authors are not directly linked to the 
personality of the creator, but contribute to the enjoyment of the right to an adequate standard 
of living’ (UN CESCR 2005, para 15). In other words, while the protection of the moral 
interests in intellectual creations deal with the personal connection between creators and their 
creations, the protection of the material interests in intellectual creations deal with the 
pecuniary connection between creators and their creations. 
In an effort to distinguish between the protection of material interests on the one hand and 
the protection of intellectual property rights on the other hand, the CESCR notes that ‘the 
purpose of enabling authors to enjoy an adequate standard of living can also be achieved 
through one-time payments or by vesting an author, for a limited period of time, with the 
exclusive right to exploit his scientific, literary or artistic production’ (Ibid para 16). In other 
words, it is not mandatory to grant patent rights or copyright in order to protect the material 
interests of intellectual workers. The right of intellectual creators to an adequate standard of 
living, i.e. their material interests, can equally be protected through other means such as one-
time payments, prizes, or monetary awards (Yu 2007a, p. 1089). 
The CESCR admits that Article 15(1)(c) of the ICESCR does not specify the method or 
procedure for the protection of the moral and material interests of authors and inventors (UN 
CESCR 2005, para 10). Nevertheless, the CESCR notes that the protection under Article 
15(1)(c) ‘need not necessarily reflect the level and means of protection found in present 
copyright, patent and other intellectual property regimes, as long as the protection available is 
suited to secure for authors the moral and material interests resulting from their productions’ 
(Ibid). 
One other factor that distinguishes the protection of moral and material interests from the 
protection of intellectual property rights is the fact that the former, being human rights, are 
inalienable rights unlike intellectual property rights. As the CESCR points out, ‘intellectual 
property rights are generally of a temporary nature, and can be revoked, licensed or assigned 
to someone else. While under most intellectual property systems, intellectual property rights, 
often with the exception of moral rights, may be allocated, limited in time and scope, 
amended and even forfeited, human rights [such as the moral and material interests of authors 
and inventors] are timeless expressions of fundamental entitlements of the human 
person’(Ibid para 2). 
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The analysis provided above on the real meaning of the phrase ‘moral and material interests’ 
should be enough to dispel any notion that patent rights or any other forms of intellectual 
property rights are human rights as canvassed by proponents of the ‘integrated approach’. 
Furthermore, in relation to the human rights status of intellectual property rights, it is also 
important to note the decision of the Constitutional Court of South Africa in Re Certification 
of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, where with regard to the objection 
lodged against the failure of the new text of the South African Constitution to recognize a 
right to intellectual property based on the grounds that it was a ‘universally accepted 
fundamental right,’ the court held that the recognition of a right to intellectual property ‘can-
not be characterised as a trend which is universally accepted’ (Re Certification, para 75). 
With regard to the ‘coexistence approach’, Gold (2013, p. 189) provides a very good critique 
thus: 
…while proponents of the coexistence approach view human rights law and patent 
protection as essentially compatible in theory, disagreement often arises in practice 
over exactly where to strike the balance between incentives for innovation on the one 
hand and access on the other … little exists by way of concrete examples of just how 
this “coexistence” plays out in practice. At best, the coexistence asserted by the 
proponents of this theory is more properly viewed as a need for coexistence, a need 
that recognises that neither intellectual property rights nor human rights are likely to 
disappear as concepts or institutions anytime soon. 
In practice, it is quite difficult to foresee how human rights and intellectual property rights 
(including patent rights) can coexist in all aspects. There are aspects of patent rights, 
particularly patent rights on pharmaceutical products and processes, that negatively impact on 
the human right to health and when such conflicts occur, a practical choice has to be made 
between patent rights or human rights. More importantly, any notion that patent rights and 
human rights can ‘peacefully coexist’ is swiftly dispelled by the recent trend of incorporating 
TRIPS-plus standards into the bilateral and plurilateral free trade agreements negotiated (or 
currently being negotiated) between developed and developing countries outside the 
multilateral framework provided by the World Trade Organization (Sell 2007, p. 59). These 
TRIPS-plus standards can exacerbate the negative impact that patent rights have on the 
enjoyment of the right to health in developing countries. 
The typical TRIPS-plus standards that are included in these bilateral and plurilateral free 
trade agreements include: the extension of patent terms to compensate for delays in the 
examination of patent applications or in obtaining marketing approval for a drug; patent 
linkage requirements that prevent the grant of marketing approval to producers of generic 
drugs when there is an existing patent on the brand name drug; the grant of patents on new 
forms or new uses of known drugs; periods of exclusivity for clinical test data; and border 
enforcement measures that permit customs authorities to seize goods suspected to have 
infringed patent rights (Correa and Matthews 2011, p. 21). These TRIPS-plus standards can 
limit the ability of a country to use the flexibilities in the TRIPS Agreement, delay the 
production of cheaper generic drugs, and consequently hinder access to affordable drugs 
(Ibid). There is therefore no better time than now for developing countries to insist on the 
primacy of human rights obligations. 
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The ‘subjugation approach’ therefore appears to be the preferable way to conceptualize the 
relationship between patent rights and human rights. Properly construed, the ‘subjugation 
approach’ does not suggest that patent rights should be discarded or abolished. It rather 
recognizes the essential distinction between the fundamental nature of human rights and the 
regulatory nature of patent rights. The intellectual property system (including the patent 
system) is best construed, according to Shubha Ghosh, as a system of rights and obligations 
that regulates creative activity (Ghosh 2008, p. 106). 
Thus, if patent rights are not human rights under international human rights law, there is no 
justifiable reason why a country should allow its patent system to trump the enjoyment of the 
human right to health. This does not necessarily mean that patent rights should no longer be 
protected, but it means that states should not permit patent rights to be exercised in ways that 
impede the enjoyment of the human right to health. Patent rights should be made to serve the 
interests protected by human rights (Drahos 1999, p. 367). 
 
2. THE RIGHT TO HEALTH IN KENYA, SOUTH AFRICA AND INDIA 
 
2.1 Kenya and South Africa 
The jurisprudence on the right to health in South Africa is more robust than that of Kenya. 
This can be explained by the fact that the right to health was introduced into the South 
African Constitution in 1996, while it was only recently introduced into the Kenyan 
Constitution in 2010. Nevertheless, the right to health is a justiciable right in Kenya pursuant 
to Article 43(1)(a) of the Kenyan Constitution of 2010 which provides that everyone has the 
right to ‘the highest attainable standard of health, which includes the right to health care 
services, including reproductive health care’. Thus, Kenyans can institute legal proceedings 
to challenge any governmental action (including legislative enactments on patent rights and 
other IPRs) that potentially or actually infringes on their right to health. 
Section 27(1)(a) of the South African Constitution of 1996 provides that everyone has the 
right to have access to ‘health care services, including reproductive health care’. Section 
27(2) further mandates the South African government to take ‘reasonable legislative and 
other measures, within its available resources, to achieve the progressive realisation of each 
of these rights’. Section 27(3) provides that no one may be refused emergency medical 
treatment. The South African Constitutional Court has, in a line of cases, made 
pronouncements on the meaning and effect of these provisions on the right to health. 
In Soobramoney v. Minister of Health, the South African Constitutional Court held that the 
appellant’s demand to receive dialysis treatment at a state hospital must be determined in 
accordance with sections 27(1) & (2) which provides for access to health care services 
provided by the state ‘within its available resources’ (Soobramoney, 1997, para 22). 
According to the court (Ibid para 29), 
The provincial administration which is responsible for health services in KwaZulu-
Natal has to make decisions about the funding that should be made available for 
health care and how such funds should be spent. These choices involve difficult 
decisions to be taken at the political level in fixing the health budget, and at the 
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functional level in deciding upon the priorities to be met. A court will be slow to 
interfere with rational decisions taken in good faith by the political organs and 
medical authorities whose responsibility it is to deal with such matters. 
The court in this case adopted what Ferraz calls the ‘reasonableness approach’ and, as Ferraz 
points out, the court confined its role ‘to an assessment of the rationality and good faith of the 
decisions taken at the political and technical branches of the state’ (Ferraz 2013, p. 385).  
The ‘reasonableness approach’ to the right to access to health care was also followed in the 
decision of the same court in the latter case of Minister of Health & Ors v. Treatment Action 
Campaign & Ors (No.2) (Minister of Health, 2002). There are however crucial differences 
between the facts of Soobramoney and the Treatment Action Campaign (TAC) case.  In the 
TAC case, TAC (an NGO involved in HIV/AIDS Advocacy) challenged the restrictions 
imposed by the South African government on the availability of nevirapine (a drug that can 
be used to prevent mother-to-child transmission of HIV) in the public health sector (Ibid para 
4). The government had confined the administration of the drug to research and training sites. 
TAC contended that these restrictions were unreasonable vis-à-vis the provisions of the 
Constitution (Ibid). According to TAC, ‘the measures adopted by government to provide 
access to health care services to HIV-positive pregnant women were deficient in two material 
respects:  first, because they prohibited the administration of nevirapine at public hospitals 
and clinics outside the research and training sites; and second, because they failed to 
implement a comprehensive programme for the prevention of mother-to-child transmission of 
HIV’ (Ibid para 44). 
One of the key issues the court had to consider was whether, in the light of provisions such as 
section 27 of the Constitution, the government was constitutionally obliged and had to be 
ordered to plan and implement an effective, comprehensive and progressive programme for 
the prevention of mother-to-child transmission of HIV throughout the country (Ibid para 5). 
The court in applying its ‘reasonableness approach’ held that the ‘policy of confining 
nevirapine to research and training sites fails to address the needs of mothers and their 
newborn children who do not have access to these sites. It fails to distinguish between the 
evaluation of programmes for reducing mother-to-child transmission and the need to provide 
access to health care required by those who do not have access to the sites’(Ibid para 67). 
Unlike its attitude towards government’s policy in Soobramoney, in this case, the court was 
willing to question the government’s policy with regard to the administration of nevirapine 
and it held that ‘the policy of government in so far as it confines the use of nevirapine to 
hospitals and clinics which are research and training sites constitutes a breach of the state’s 
obligations under section 27(2) read with section 27(1)(a) of the Constitution’ (Ibid para 80). 
The policy was held to be unreasonable. According to the court, ‘a policy of waiting for a 
protracted period before taking a decision on the use of nevirapine beyond the research and 
training sites is also not reasonable within the meaning of section 27(2) of the Constitution’ 
(Ibid para 81). 
The court ordered the government to, inter alia, remove without delay, ‘the restrictions that 
prevent nevirapine from being made available for the purpose of reducing the risk of mother-
to-child transmission of HIV at public hospitals and clinics that are not research and training 
sites’ (Ibid para 135(3)(a)). The implication of the TAC case is that, even though the South 
African Constitutional Court prefers to adopt a ‘reasonableness approach’ in its evaluation of 
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government policies that affect socio-economic rights and despite the fact that the court 
equally respects the doctrine of separation of powers, where the government adopts a policy 
that is unreasonable and inconsistent with the provisions of the Constitution, the court can 
actually give an order that has an impact on policy making.  
It should also be noted that in the TAC case, the government’s policies with regard to the 
administration of nevirapine was not based on resource constraints like in the Soobramoney 
case. As Ferraz notes, the ‘cost of providing the drug was virtually none, given a pledge by 
the pharmaceutical suppliers to give it for free’ (Ferraz 2013, p. 388). Even the court 
acknowledged the fact that the ‘cost of nevirapine for preventing mother-to-child 
transmission is not an issue in the present proceedings’ and that it was ‘admittedly within the 
resources of the state’ (Constitutional Court of South Africa 2002, para 71). The government 
policies on nevirapine were based on what Ferraz (2013, p. 388) calls ‘dubious (not to say 
completely ungrounded) assertions that the drug in question (Nevirapine) was not 
scientifically proven to work’. 
In Minister of Health v. New Clicks, (Minister of Health, 2005), the South African 
Constitutional Court held that the right to health also includes the right to have access to 
affordable medicines and that the state has an obligation to ‘promote access to medicines that 
are affordable’ (Ibid para 514). According to Sachs J. in this case, ‘preventing excessive 
profit-taking from the manufacturing, distribution and sale of medicines is more than an 
option for government. It is a constitutional obligation flowing from its duties under section 
27(2)’ (Ibid para 659). In the same case, Moseneke J. (Ibid para 706) stated that, 
It seems self-evident that there can be no adequate access to medicines if they are not 
within one’s means. Prohibitive pricing of medicine ... would in effect equate to a 
denial of the right of access to health care. Equally true is that the state bears the 
obligation to everyone to facilitate equity in the access to essential drugs which in turn 
affect the quality of care. 
A combined reading of section 27 of the South African Constitution and the decisions in 
Soobramoney, TAC, and New Clicks leads one to conclude that the right to health care in 
South Africa, which includes the right to have access to affordable medicines, imposes an 
obligation on the government to facilitate access to affordable medicines through the 
adoption of reasonable measures though this obligation can only be fulfilled within the limits 
of available resources. Furthermore, where the government adopts a policy that is 
inconsistent with the Constitution and which also violates the right to health, the court can 
demand that the government should change its policy. 
 
2.2 India 
The Indian Constitution, which came into force in 1950, incorporates civil and political rights 
as fundamental rights in Part III of the Constitution while socio-economic rights are 
contained in Part IV of the Constitution which deals with the Directive Principles of State 
Policy. In relation to health, Article 39(e), contained in Part IV of the Constitution, provides 
that the state shall, in particular, direct its policy towards securing ‘that the health and 
strength of workers, men and women, and the tender age of children are not abused’. Another 
provision in Part IV of the Constitution that touches on health is Article 41 which provides 
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inter alia that the state ‘shall, within the limits of its economic capacity and development, 
make effective provision for securing the right to … public assistance in cases of … sickness 
and disablement’. Furthermore, Article 47, also contained in Part IV of the Constitution, 
provides inter alia that the state ‘shall regard the raising of the level of nutrition and the 
standard of living of its people and the improvement of public health as among its primary 
duties’. 
However, the provisions of Part IV of the Indian Constitution are non-justiciable. According 
to Article 37 of the Constitution, the provisions of Part IV of the Constitution ‘shall not be 
enforceable by any court’ though ‘the principles therein laid are nevertheless fundamental in 
the governance of the country’ and the state has the duty ‘to apply these principle in making 
laws’. Initially, the Indian Supreme Court adopted a strict approach towards the interpretation 
of this prohibition against the justiciability of the Directive Principles of State Policy. As 
Dhanda (2013, p. 406) points out, 
In the early years, this prohibition of justiciability was strictly interpreted by the 
Supreme Court. Thus, the Court ruled that legislation was required for the 
implementation of the Directives. The [Directive Principles of State Policy] without 
more did not create a justiciable right in favour of individuals. Consequently, courts 
could not compel the state to carry out any of the [Directive Principles of State 
Policy]. Further, due to the prohibition on justiciability, no law could be declared void 
on the ground that it infringed the [Directive Principles of State Policy]. 
In subsequent years, however, the Indian Supreme Court began to adopt an ‘expanded 
reading’ of the justiciable provisions on civil and political rights and they ‘started to 
pronounce upon matters of health which were by the text of the Constitution included in the 
[Directive Principles of State Policy]’ (Dhanda 2013, p. 406). Essentially, the court found a 
way of ‘settling the contours of the right to health’ through the adoption of an expansive 
reading of the fundamental right to life contained in Article 21 of the Indian Constitution 
(Ibid). According to Article 21 of the Indian Constitution, ‘No person shall be deprived of his 
life or personal liberty except according to procedure established by law’. 
Dhanda notes that the Indian Supreme Court ‘started with a very formal and legalistic 
interpretation’ of the right to life by ruling ‘that the deprivation of life and liberty was 
permissible provided it was done by a duly enacted parliamentary legislation’ (Ibid). The 
Supreme Court moved progressively from this formal and legalistic interpretation and it 
started to expand the ambit of the right to life by first enhancing ‘the fairness requirements of 
the right to life and liberty depriving procedure’ and then the court later pronounced on ‘the 
quality of life guaranteed by the Constitution’ (Ibid). The court ruled that the right to life 
‘was not a right to bare physical existence but a right to a full and meaningful life. And a full 
and meaningful life includes the right to health within its purview’ (Ibid pp. 406-407). Some 
of the cases where the Indian Supreme Court has made pronouncements on the right to health 
are examined below. 
In Consumer Education & Research Centre and others v.  Union of India and others, the 
Indian Supreme Court held that the ‘expression “life” assured in Art. 21 of the Constitution 
does not connote mere animal existence or continued drudgery through life. It has a much 
wider meaning which includes right to livelihood, better standard of life, hygienic conditions 
in [the] work place and leisure’ (Consumer Education & Research Centre, 1995, para 24). In 
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the same case, the Supreme Court held that ‘the right to health and medical care is a 
fundamental right under Article 21’ (Ibid para 26). 
In Paschim Banga Khet Samity v. State of West Bengal, (Paschim Banga Khet Samity, 1996, 
para 9), which involved the failure of government medical hospitals to provide timely 
emergency medical treatment to an individual who fell off a train and who suffered serious 
head injuries and brain haemorrhage, the Indian Supreme Court held that, 
Article 21 imposes an obligation on the State to safeguard the right to life of every 
person. Preservation of human life is thus of paramount importance. The Government 
hospitals run by the State and the Medical Officers employed therein are duty bound 
to extend medical assistance for preserving human life.  Failure on the part of a 
Government hospital to provide timely medical treatment to a person in need of such 
treatment results in [a] violation of his right to life guaranteed under Article 21. 
The court further noted that the limitation of financial resources cannot justify the failure of 
the state to discharge its constitutional obligations with regard to the provision of adequate 
medical services (Ibid para 16). However, arguments relating to the limitation of financial 
resources in the context of the right to health and the provision of medical facilities by the 
state are not entirely foreclosed by the Indian Supreme Court. Where, due to the limitation of 
financial resources, the government has adopted a particular policy with regard to the 
provision of medical services, the Indian Supreme Court assesses the particular policy by 
adopting an approach akin to the ‘reasonableness approach’ adopted by the South African 
Constitutional Court in the Soobramoney case. 
For instance, in State of Punjab and others v. Ram Lubhaya Bagga, the Indian Supreme Court 
had to determine whether the State of Punjab was justified in adopting a policy of not 
reimbursing an employee for his full medical expenses if such expenses were incurred in any 
hospital in India that was not a government-owned hospital in Punjab. In this case, the 
Supreme Court (State of Punjab, 1998) held that,  
[S]o far as questioning the validity of governmental policy is concerned, in our view it 
is not normally within the domain of any court, to weigh the pros and cons of the 
policy or to scrutinize it and test the degree of its beneficial or equitable disposition 
for the purpose of varying or modifying it, based on however sound and good 
reasoning, except where it is arbitrary or violative of any constitutional, statutory or 
any other provision of law.  When Government forms its policy, it is based on [a] 
number of circumstances … including constraints based on its resources … it would 
be dangerous if [the] court is asked to test the utility, beneficial effect of the policy or 
its appraisal based on facts set out on affidavits. The Court would dissuade itself from 
entering into this realm which belongs to the executive. It is within this matrix that it 
is to be seen whether the new policy violates Article 21 when it restricts 
reimbursement on account of … financial constraints. 
In other words, once the government has already adopted a policy with regard to the 
provision of a medical facility, unless the said policy is arbitrary or unreasonable, the court 
will not interfere in accordance with the doctrine of separation of powers. The implication of 
this is that the government cannot rely on the argument that it has financial constraints to 
justify its failure to provide a medical facility. As the court held in the Samity case, the state 
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cannot avoid its obligation on account of financial constraints. The state has to take steps to 
establish a policy with regard to the provision of medical facilities and limited financial 
resources will not excuse the government’s failure to establish a policy in this regard. But 
once the government has adopted a particular policy with regard to the provision of a medical 
facility, the court will only interfere where that policy is unreasonable or violative of the 
Constitution. 
Thus in the Lubhaya Bagga case, the court held that, ‘the State can neither urge nor say that it 
has no obligation to provide [a] medical facility. If that were so it would be ex facie violative 
of Article 21’ (Ibid). The court then noted that under the policy adopted by the State of 
Punjab, ‘medical facility continues to be given and … an employee is given [the] free choice 
to get treatment in any private hospital in India but the amount of payment towards 
reimbursement is regulated’ (Ibid). The court held that this policy was not in violation of 
Articles 21 or 47 of the Constitution (Ibid). The approach adopted by the court in the 
Lubhaya Bagga case was followed in the latter case of Confederation of Ex-Servicemen 
Associations and others v. Union of India and others (Supreme Court of India 2006). 
In 2014, in the case of Mohd. Ahmed (Minor) v. Union of India and others, the Delhi High 
Court made some landmark pronouncements on the right to health in the context of access to 
medicines as it affects a patient suffering from a rare disease (Mohd. Ahmed, 2014). The 
central issue before the court was whether a child born to poor parents and who is suffering 
from Gaucher’s disease (a chronic and rare disease) is entitled to free medical treatment 
especially when the treatment for the disease is known, the prognosis is good, and there is 
every likelihood that the child can lead a normal life (Ibid para 1).  
It was argued on behalf of the child that, since the drugs needed for the treatment of the child 
is available in India, both the Central Government and the Government of Delhi had an 
obligation under Article 21 of the Constitution to provide free treatment to the child and other 
patients in the same situation (Ibid para 11). The child’s counsel argued that the government 
could not raise the plea of financial constraint (Ibid para 14). The plea of financial constraint 
however formed the kernel of the submissions made by the Central Government and the 
Government of Delhi. They contended that because of their limited resources they are unable 
to fund the treatment of the child as the disease is a lifelong one and the condition of the child 
is chronic (Ibid para 27). 
Anand Grover, the former UN Special Rapporteur on the Right to Health, equally made some 
legal submissions in this case. Grover argued that, as India had signed and ratified the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), India is duty 
bound to fulfil its international legal obligations (Ibid para 34). According to Grover (Ibid 
para 35), 
States are required to adopt and implement a public health strategy and plan of action 
that reflects the epidemiological burden of disease that not only addresses major 
disease burdens but also the health concerns of the whole population. Therefore … 
even if a small percentage of the population had a life-threatening condition there 
should be [a] public health strategy and plan to address their treatment needs. In other 
words, the Government can be directed to have a plan in place to make medicines 
available for rare diseases, like Gaucher disease etc. 
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Grover’s argument brings into focus the central problem with the government’s argument in 
this case. Essentially, the Indian government had failed to put in place a policy or adopt a 
public health strategy to provide medicines to those suffering from rare diseases such as 
Gaucher’s disease. This is a violation of the government’s obligation with regard to the right 
to health. It is true that the government has limited resources, but as the Indian Supreme 
Court held in the Samity case, the state cannot avoid its constitutional obligation with regard 
to the right to health on account of financial constraints. Even in the Lubhaya Bagga case 
where the Indian Supreme Court recognized the fact that the financial resources of the state 
are not unlimited, the court still made it clear that the failure to adopt a policy with regard to 
the provision of a medical facility is ex facie violative of the Constitution. 
In this case, neither the Central Government nor the Delhi Government had adopted any 
policy or public health strategy for the provision of drugs to those suffering from rare 
diseases. As the Delhi High Court pointed out, ‘Unfortunately, the Government of India does 
not have any policy measure in place to address rare diseases, particularly those of a chronic 
nature. All the Central and State schemes at the highest provide for a one-time grant for life-
saving procedures and do not contemplate continuous financial assistance for a chronic 
disease such as [Gaucher’s disease], which involves lifelong expenditure’ (Ibid para 42). The 
court however stated that, in accordance with the doctrine of separation of powers, it could 
not direct parliament to enact a legislation on the right to public health or with regard to rare 
diseases or orphan drugs, even though this may be eminently desirable (Ibid para 44). 
According to the court, as the ‘formulation of a policy is within the exclusive domain of the 
Executive,’ it will refrain from issuing directives for the formulation of a policy (Ibid para 
45). 
In its decision in this case, the court referred to the UN CESCR’s General Comment No. 14 
on the right to health. The court quoted paragraph 43(d) of General Comment No. 14 which 
states that one of the core obligations with regard to the right to health (from which no 
derogation is permissible) is the provision of essential drugs. Furthermore, the court quoted 
paragraph 52 of General Comment No. 14 which provides that a state violates its obligation 
to fulfil the right to health when it fails to, inter alia, ‘adopt or implement a national health 
policy designed to ensure the right to health for everyone’. The court admitted that the state 
does not have unlimited financial resources. Nevertheless, the court held that ‘no Government 
can say that it will not treat patients with chronic and rare diseases due to financial 
constraint[s]’ (Ibid para 64). The court adopted the view that ‘core obligations under the right 
to health are non-derogable’ and that though ‘this minimum core is not easy to define,’ it 
‘includes at least the minimum decencies of life consistent with human dignity’ (Ibid para 
67).  
Invariably, the court came to the conclusion that the state has an obligation to provide access 
to medicines, including medicines for rare diseases. According to the court (Ibid paras 68-
69), ‘ 
Article 21 of the Constitution clearly imposes a duty on the Government to take 
whatever steps are necessary to ensure that everyone has access to health facilities, 
goods and services, so that they can enjoy, as soon as possible, the highest attainable 
standard of physical and mental health … Government must at the bare minimum 
ensure that individuals have access to essential medicines even for rare diseases like 
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enzyme replacement for Gaucher disease … Government cannot cite financial crunch 
as a reason not to fulfil its obligation to ensure access to medicines or to adopt a plan 
of action to treat rare diseases … no government can wriggle out of its core obligation 
of ensuring the right of access to health facilities for [the] vulnerable and 
marginalized section of society [such as] the petitioner by stating that it cannot afford 
to provide treatment for rare and chronic diseases. 
Thus, by failing to adopt a policy for the provision of medicines for the treatment of rare 
diseases such as Gaucher’s disease, the government had violated its constitutional obligation 
with regard to the right to health (Ibid paras 85-86). As health is a subject matter within the 
jurisdiction of the state government in India, the court ordered the Government of Delhi to 
‘discharge its constitutional obligation and provide the petitioner with enzyme replacement 
therapy … free of charge as and when he requires it’ (Ibid para 89). 
The ruling of the court with regard to the non-derogable core obligation of the state to 
provide access to essential medicines at affordable prices, irrespective of resource constraints, 
has enormous implications for the tension between patent rights and the right to health in 
India. Even though the court in this case did not consider the tension between patent rights 
and the right to health, the court has confirmed by its ruling that the Indian government has a 
non-derogable core obligation to facilitate access to essential medicines at affordable prices. 
This ruling implies that in any case where the exercise or enforcement of patent rights on 
pharmaceutical products granted by the government hinders poor patients from having access 
to essential medicines, there is a violation of the government’s obligation to provide access to 
essential medicines at affordable prices. If this approach is incorporated into the decisions of 
the Indian courts whenever they are adjudicating disputes involving the interpretation or 
enforcement of patent rights, it will ensure that owners of patent rights on pharmaceutical 
products are not allowed to exercise their patent rights in a manner that impedes the 
enjoyment of the right to health. 
Thus, three clear principles are discernible from the decisions of the Indian courts on the right 
to health. One, the state cannot justify its failure to provide medical facilities by arguing that 
it has limited financial resources. The state is obliged to at least adopt a policy with regard to 
the provision of medical facilities. Two, once a policy has been adopted by the state, the court 
will only interfere with such a policy if it is unconstitutional or unreasonable or arbitrary. As 
long as the policy itself is not unreasonable, the measures contained in the policy need not be 
adequate. Three, the state has a core obligation to provide access to essential medicines at 
affordable prices. There can be no derogation from this core obligation irrespective of 
financial constraints. 
 
3. INCORPORATING THE RIGHT TO HEALTH INTO THE ADJUDICATION 
OF DISPUTES INVOLVING PHARMACEUTICAL PATENTS 
 
3.1 Kenya 
In the 2008 case of Pfizer Inc. v. Cosmos Limited, Pfizer alleged that Cosmos had infringed 
its patent on a medicinal product known as ‘azithromycin dihydrate’ (Pfizer Inc., 2008, p. 1). 
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Cosmos argued, inter alia, that it was entitled to import, manufacture, sell, and export the 
patented product without the authority of Pfizer by virtue of section 58(2) of the Industrial 
Property Act which allows parallel importation. Section 58(2) provides that ‘the rights under 
the patent shall not extend to acts in respect of articles which have been put on the market in 
Kenya or in any other country or imported into Kenya’. Cosmos presented evidence to the 
tribunal establishing that the medicines containing the patented product were available in 
Kenya having been imported from India, Bangladesh, and China (Ibid pp. 3-4). In other 
words, the patent rights of Pfizer, with respect to those products which were readily available 
in Kenya, had been exhausted. Cosmos was attempting to rely on the principle of 
international exhaustion of patent rights as reflected in section 58(2), and though this 
principle might not give Cosmos the right to manufacture the patented product, it would 
entitle Cosmos to import those patented products from India, Bangladesh, and China and to 
resell them in Kenya. 
However, in a rather curious and confusing manner, the tribunal conflated parallel 
importation with compulsory licenses and voluntary licenses. According to the tribunal, 
‘parallel importation ... is applicable for instance where the government has allowed a third 
party to exploit the patent, and that party imports the product from other countries where it is 
legitimately put on the market ... This could also be with the authority of the patent holder by 
way of a contractual or voluntary license’ (Ibid p. 13). The tribunal could not comprehend a 
situation where a third party could engage in the parallel importation of a patented product 
without the authorization of the patentee or the government and its definition of parallel 
importation clearly contradicts what is contained in section 58(2). Section 58(2) does not 
actually require a person or a company to obtain government authorization or a 
compulsory/voluntary license before engaging in parallel importation. 
Cosmos equally argued that the patented product was used for the treatment of opportunistic 
infections in HIV/AIDS patients and that the WHO listed the product as an essential medicine 
for the treatment of genital chlamydia trachomatis and trachoma (Ibid p. 16). By raising this 
argument, Cosmos had highlighted a tension between the enforcement of Pfizer’s patent 
rights on one hand and the need to facilitate access to this essential medicine for Kenyan 
patients on the other hand. The resolution of this tension therefore required a proper 
appreciation of the fact that patent rights ought to serve the needs and interests of 
fundamental rights such as the right to have access to essential medicines at affordable prices. 
If the tension had been approached from this dimension, it would have enabled the tribunal to 
interpret the patent law with the objective of ensuring that it does not impede access to 
medicines. However, in this particular case, the Kenyan tribunal took the view that the 
product was not a first-line treatment for HIV/AIDS patients and that even if this were the 
case, it would not entitle the respondents to exploit the patent without authorization (Ibid p. 
17).  
By interpreting the provisions of section 58(2) in this manner and ignoring the impact this 
could have on access to anti-retroviral drugs in Kenya, the tribunal overlooked the rationale 
behind the introduction of parallel importation into the Kenyan Industrial Property Act of 
2001 via the provisions of section 58(2). During the parliamentary debates on the 2001 Act, it 
was stated by the Kenyan Minister for Trade and Industry that the provision on parallel 
importation was specifically introduced to permit the importation into Kenya of ‘medicines 
which are required for human life, especially [for the treatment of] HIV/AIDS and [other] 
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opportunistic diseases, as well as malaria’ (Kenyan National Assembly Official Record 2001, 
p. 1043). 
The tribunal thus failed to appreciate the essential distinction between the regulatory nature 
of patent rights and the fundamental nature of the right to have access to essential medicines. 
It could be argued that the tribunal failed to appreciate this essential distinction because 
Article 43(1)(a), which made the right to health a justiciable right in Kenya, was only 
introduced into the Kenyan Constitution in 2010 i.e. two years after the tribunal’s judgment. 
However, even without invoking a constitutional right to health, a tribunal that is mindful of 
the fundamental importance of securing access to medicines would have examined the 
rationale behind the inclusion of section 58(2) in the Kenyan patent law. As noted above, 
section 58(2) was introduced in order to facilitate the importation of medicines for the 
treatment of HIV/AIDS and opportunistic ailments. A tribunal that is mindful of the 
fundamental importance of facilitating access to affordable medicines would have construed 
section 58(2) in accordance with the objective of ensuring that the enforcement of a patent 
right does not defeat the aims of the drafters of the patent law. 
In the more recent case of Patricia Asero Ochieng et al. v. Attorney General, the Kenyan 
High Court had an opportunity to consider the relationship between intellectual property 
rights and the right to health (Patricia Asero Ochieng, 2012). In this case, the petitioners were 
HIV/AIDS patients, and they alleged that certain sections of the Kenyan Anti-Counterfeit Act 
of 2008 threatened their access to essential drugs thereby infringing their right to life, dignity, 
and health (Ibid para 1). The petitioners argued that the government failed to specifically 
exempt generic drugs from the definition of counterfeit goods in the Act (Ibid para 14). 
Specifically, section 2 of the Act defined counterfeiting in relation to medicine to mean ‘the 
deliberate and fraudulent mislabelling of medicine with respect to identity or source, whether 
or not such products have correct ingredients, wrong ingredients, have sufficient active 
ingredients or have fake packaging’. The respondents, however, argued that the Anti-
Counterfeit Act was enacted to prohibit trade in counterfeit goods in Kenya and was not 
intended to prohibit generic drugs (Ibid para 39). The respondents argued that the Act was 
intended to ‘protect the public from the harm of using counterfeit goods and that extra care 
needs to be taken to ensure that the medicine in the market meets the required standard’ (Ibid 
para 42). 
Contrary to the arguments of the respondents in this case, it appears that the real intent behind 
the Kenyan Anti-Counterfeit Act was not really the protection of the public from harm but 
the Act was designed to secure, among other things, the intellectual property rights of 
pharmaceutical companies. Von Braun and Munyi (2010, p. 243) point out that, because the 
two bills preceding the enactment of the Anti-Counterfeit Act were not backed by any public 
policy decision, it is ‘difficult to discern the real motive or motivations behind the enactment 
of the legislation’ but ‘during the legislative process, there was a lot of public debate, at least 
as demonstrated by numerous media reports on the effect counterfeiting has had on the local 
manufacturing sector’ and the ‘Kenya Association of Manufacturers … was leading in the 
lobbying towards legislation on anti-counterfeiting’. Harrington and O’Hare (2014, p. 22) 
equally note that the Kenya Association of Manufacturers played a key role in securing the 
passage of the Act. According to Harrington and O’Hare (Ibid), the Kenya Association of 
Manufacturers ‘represents over 700 members, both domestic and foreign-owned firms, 
among whom are major pharmaceutical concerns marketing and manufacturing their products 
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in Kenya’. They note that the Association established an Anti-Counterfeit Committee and 
‘engaged closely in the legislative process itself’ while also ‘frequently briefing key 
parliamentary committees’ (Ibid). 
The former UN Special Rapporteur on the Right to Health, Anand Grover, filed an amicus 
brief in the Ochieng case. According to the former Special Rapporteur, ‘the definition of 
“counterfeiting” within the Act effectively conflates generic medicines with medicines which 
are produced in violation of private intellectual property rights, and this conflation of 
legitimately produced generic medicines with those that possibly violate intellectual property 
rights is likely to have a serious adverse impact on the availability, affordability and 
accessibility of low-cost, high-quality medicines’ (Patricia Asero Ochieng, para 35). Grover 
agreed with the contention of the petitioners that the Act could endanger the right to health 
because it does not exclude generic drugs (Ibid para 34). Grover also provided a definition of 
generic medicines (which was quoted in the court’s judgment) as drugs that ‘have the same 
composition and contain the same substances as patented formulations of the same drugs, and 
are essentially identical copies [that] can be used for the same purposes as their non-generic 
counterparts’ (Ibid para 76). 
In its analysis of the meaning and implication of the right to health, the High Court referred to 
Article 43(1)(a) of the Kenyan Constitution which guarantees the right to health, Article 12 of 
the ICESCR, and the UN CESCR’s General Comment No. 14 on the right to health. The 
High Court proceeded to delineate the nature of the state’s obligation with regard to the right 
to health. The court held that the state’s obligation entails both a positive and a negative duty. 
The state has a positive duty to ensure that its citizens have access to health care services and 
medicines; it equally has a negative duty to refrain from taking actions that would affect 
access to these health care services and medicines (Ibid para 66). Thus, any legislative 
enactment that would make medicines too expensive for citizens would be in violation of the 
state’s obligation (Ibid). 
The court equally highlighted the danger inherent in conflating the definition of counterfeit 
drugs and generic drugs by referring to cases where generic drugs in transit were seized on 
the basis of being counterfeit (Ibid para 75). Though the court did not mention any particular 
country, it is obvious that the court was referring to instances like the seizure by Dutch 
Customs authorities in 2008 and 2009 of multiple shipments of drugs that were in-transit 
from India to developing countries in Africa and Latin America (Micara 2012). The court 
agreed with the petitioners and the Special Rapporteur that the ‘definition of “counterfeit” in 
section 2 of the Act is likely to be read as including generic medication’ and quoting from the 
Special Rapporteur’s amicus brief, it stated that ‘this would affect the availability of generic 
drugs and pose a real threat to the petitioners’ right to life, dignity and health’ (Patricia Asero 
Ochieng, para 78). The court disagreed with the respondent’s argument that the Act was 
primarily intended to protect consumers from counterfeit medicines. According to the court 
‘the tenor and object of the Act is to protect the intellectual property rights of individuals’ 
(Ibid para 82). 
The court was of the view that the rights to life, dignity, and health must take priority over 
intellectual property rights. The court noted that if the Act is implemented as originally 
written, ‘the danger that it poses to the right of the petitioners to access essential medicine ... 
is far greater and more critical than the protection of the intellectual property rights that the 
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Act seeks to protect. The right to life, dignity and health of the petitioners must take 
precedence over the intellectual property rights of patent holders’ (Ibid para 85). The court 
thus adopted and applied the ‘subjugation approach’ by upholding the primacy of human 
rights over intellectual property rights. The High Court further held that, ‘It is incumbent on 
the state to reconsider the provisions of section 2 of the Anti-Counterfeit Act alongside its 
constitutional obligation to ensure that its citizens have access to the highest attainable 
standard of health and make appropriate amendments to ensure that the rights of petitioners 
and others dependent on generic medicines are not put in jeopardy.’ (Ibid para 88). However, 
unfortunately the Kenyan government failed to incorporate the court’s ruling in this case into 
the recent amendments made to the Anti-Counterfeit Act in 2014 despite the demands of 
health activists in this regard. (Nzomo 2014).  
Unlike the approach adopted by the tribunal in the Pfizer v. Cosmos case, the decision of the 
Kenyan High Court in this case demonstrates the court’s recognition of the tension between 
the enforcement of intellectual property rights and the protection of the right to health. The 
court refused to be misguided into overlooking the fact that the Anti-Counterfeit Act was 
enacted to enhance the protection of intellectual property rights in Kenya. With the 
recognition that there was a tension to be resolved, the court equally demonstrated an implicit 
understanding of the essential distinction between the fundamental nature of the right to 
health and the regulatory nature of IPRs. This can be seen from the court’s statement that the 
danger posed by the Anti-Counterfeit Act to the petitioner’s right to access essential 
medicines was far greater and more critical than the protection of IPRs. It is therefore not 
surprising that the court, while not disparaging IPRs, held that the right to health must take 
priority over IPRs. 
These two cases from Kenya illustrate the important role that courts can play in enhancing 
access to medicines in developing countries. In a situation where most courts adopt the 
approach of the tribunal in the Pfizer case, there is no doubt that patent rights will almost 
always trump the right to health. However, if courts adopt the more robust approach that was 
applied by the Kenyan High Court in the Ochieng case, it will lead to two things: one, states 
will be careful in implementing legislation (especially legislation on patent rights) that can 
significantly impede access to medicines; and, two, pharmaceutical companies that own 
patents on pharmaceutical products will ensure that they do not exercise their patent rights in 
ways that negatively affect the enjoyment of the right to health. 
 
3.2 South Africa 
In Pfizer Ltd. v. Cipla Medpro (Pty) Ltd., (Pfizer, 2005) Cipla Medpro had initiated 
revocation proceedings against Pfizer in 2004 with regards to one of Pfizer’s pharmaceutical 
patents. Cipla had alleged that the patent was unclear and obvious. The patent in question 
concerned a ‘besylate salt of amlodipine, a drug used for hypertension and reduction of blood 
pressure’ (Ibid p. 2). Pfizer markets a product called Norvasc which contains the patented 
chemical while Cipla had already started to market its own generic version called Nortwin in 
South Africa even before Pfizer’s patent expired or was revoked (Ibid). In response to Cipla’s 
application for the revocation of its patent (which was set to expire in 2007), Pfizer brought 
this action for an interim interdict against Cipla to prevent the infringement of its patent 
pending the final determination of the revocation proceedings. In granting Pfizer’s 
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application for an interim interdict, Botha J., sitting as the Commissioner of Patents, held that 
(Ibid p. 22): 
If one looks at the broad picture: the respondents have hardly entered the market. The 
applicants have only two years of their patent left. In two years the respondents will 
be at liberty to sell Nortwin in any event. The applicant is a manufacturer that relies 
on patent protection to recoup the cost of research and development. The respondent 
is a manufacturer of generic products that are manufactured without the expense of 
original research. For that reason it is wrong to argue, as the respondents have done 
endlessly, that the applicants can retain their market share by reducing their prices. 
The regime of an open market is only something to which they have to submit on the 
expiry of the patent. 
It is rather surprising that the only characters that featured in the court’s ‘broad picture’ were 
just the applicant and the respondent – Pfizer and Cipla. The court appears to have been more 
concerned about the importance of ensuring that Pfizer is able to recoup the money it spent 
on research and development. While it is fair for pharmaceutical companies to seek to recoup 
their investment in producing new drugs, the approach adopted by the court completely 
ignores other important characters like poor patients who might not be able to afford to pay 
for Norvasc sold by Pfizer but who might be able to afford Nortwin sold by Cipla. In other 
words, the court should have considered the potential impact that Pfizer’s patent rights could 
have on the enjoyment of the right to health by poor patients in South Africa. 
In a latter case, Aventis v. Cipla, the dispute involved a patent for ‘New Taxoid-Based 
Compositions’ that belonged to Aventis and which covered claims for compositions 
containing ‘Taxane’ derivatives including the Taxane derivative known as ‘docetaxel’ 
(Aventis, 2011, para 2). Taxane derivatives such as docetaxel are used as chemotherapy 
treatments for a number of cancers (Ibid). Aventis was seeking an interim interdict against 
Cipla because, in March 2011, Aventis discovered that Cipla was about to import into South 
Africa two products made in India, ‘Cipla Docetaxel’ and ‘Cipla Docetaxel solvent’, which 
when mixed with the relevant product will constitute an infringement of the patent belonging 
to Aventis (Ibid para 3). Aventis therefore brought an application for an interdict to prohibit 
the respondents from mixing the Cipla products and an interdict to prohibit the respondents 
from selling the products to any person who will mix the products in accordance with the 
patent (Ibid para 3). The interim interdict was refused because the Commissioner of Patents 
was of the view that the applicants’ prospect of success at a full trial was slender (Ibid para 
26). 
Aventis however appealed to the South African Supreme Court of Appeal and the decision of 
the Commissioner of Patents was overruled by the Supreme Court of Appeal (Aventis, 2012). 
With regard to Aventis’ request for an interim interdict, the appellate court agreed with the 
arguments of the amicus curiae, Treatment Action Campaign that the public interest cannot 
be ignored when deciding whether or not to issue an interim interdict (Ibid para 46). The 
NGO based its opposition to the grant of an interim interdict on the right to health guaranteed 
in section 27(1) of the South African Constitution and urged the appellate court to construe 
the Patents Act ‘through the prism of the Constitution’ and in a way that appropriately 
balances the rights of a patentee against the constitutional rights of others (Ibid para 44). 
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The appellate court was however of the view that construing the Patents Act through the 
prism of the Constitution does not necessarily mean that Aventis should be denied the right to 
enforce its patent (Ibid para 45). In its consideration of the balance of convenience and the 
public interest, the court noted that there was no suggestion that Aventis was not able to meet 
the demand for the patented drug nor could it be said that Cipla’s version of the drug offered 
superior medicinal benefits (Ibid para 55). The court further noted that there would be no 
material disruption to patients if an interdict was granted (Ibid). The court was not swayed by 
the argument that an interdict would adversely affect patients that could not afford Cipla’s 
drug. According to the court, ‘[w]here the public is denied access to a generic [drug] during 
the lifetime of a patent, that is the ordinary consequence of patent protection and it applies as 
much in all cases. To refuse an interdict only so as to frustrate the patentee’s lawful 
monopoly seems to ... be an abuse of the discretionary powers of a court’ (Ibid para 56). 
What can be deduced from this approach is that, while the court was willing to consider the 
public interest and the rights of patients, it was equally reluctant to allow these interests and 
rights to trump the monopoly rights of patentees. In essence, the court was willing to hold 
that the denial of access to generic drugs should be considered as part of the price the society 
pays for securing monopoly rights through the grant of patents. The court did not however 
attempt to consider whether the right to health could take precedence over patent rights in 
certain cases. This is probably because it was unnecessary to do so in this particular case. 
Based on the facts presented before the court, there would be no material prejudice to poor 
patients if an interim interdict was granted to Aventis. It was established before the court that 
Aventis was already marketing its own generic version of the patented drug and, more 
importantly, the patented drug itself was already being sold to the government at a rate which 
was cheaper than the price of Cipla’s generic version (Ibid para 57). The court therefore held 
that Aventis’ patented drug was ‘considerably more accessible’ to patients dependent on 
public health care than Cipla’s generic version and that ‘there will be no prejudice at all to 
those patients, or to the state, if an interdict were to be granted’ (Ibid para 58). 
3.3 India 
In the case of Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd. v. Cipla Ltd., the Delhi High Court refused to grant an 
injunction sought by Roche against Cipla for the latter’s production of ‘Erloticip’ (a generic 
version of Roche’s patented anti-cancer drug known as ‘Erlotinib’). The Delhi High Court 
noted that (Hoffmann-La Roche, 2008, para 85): 
[T]he Court cannot be unmindful of the right of the general public to access life 
saving drugs which are available and for which such access would be denied if the 
injunction were granted … The degree of harm in such eventuality is absolute; the 
chances of improvement of life expectancy; even chances of recovery in some cases 
would be snuffed out altogether, if [an] injunction [were to be] granted … Another 
way of viewing it is that if the injunction in the case of a life saving drug were to be 
granted, the Court would in effect be stifling Article 21 [of the Indian Constitution] so 
far as those [who] would have or could have access to Erloticip are concerned. 
According to the Delhi High Court, ‘as between the two competing public interests, that is, 
the public interest in granting an injunction to affirm a patent during the pendency of an 
infringement action, as opposed to the public interest in access for people to a life saving 
drug, the balance has to be tilted in favour of the latter’ (Ibid para 86). The court observed 
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that the damage that would be suffered by Roche (the patent owner) in this case can be 
assessed in monetary terms but the ‘injury to the public which would be deprived of the 
defendants product, which may lead to shortening of lives of several unknown persons, who 
are not parties to the suit, and which damage cannot be restituted in monetary terms, is not 
only uncompensatable, it is irreparable’ (Ibid). 
The decision of the Delhi High Court in this case was upheld on appeal by the Division 
Bench of the Delhi High Court (Hoffmann-La Roche, 2009). In concurring with the trial 
court, the Division Bench (Ibid para 81) held that, 
[I]n a country like India where [the] question of general public access to life saving 
drugs assumes great significance, the adverse impact on such access which the grant 
of [an] injunction in a case like the instant one is likely to have, would have to be 
accounted for. [Erloticip] is the Indian equivalent produced by the defendant in India 
as a generic drug manufacturer. It is priced at Rs. 1600 per tablet. Even if this does 
not make it inexpensive, the question of [the] greater availability of such [a] drug in 
the market assumes significance. 
However, the Delhi High Court has also held in Novartis v. Cipla Ltd that a generic drug 
company cannot rely on the right to life contained in Article 21 of the Indian Constitution to 
justify the infringement of a valid patent (Novartis, 2015, para 89). In this case, the court 
granted an injunction restraining Cipla from infringing Novartis’ patent on Indacaterol (a 
drug used in the treatment of chronic obstructive pulmonary disease). The court stated that 
Novartis had established a prima facie case for the validity of its patent and that Cipla has 
merely urged grounds of invalidity by relying on documents which according to Cipla 
constitutes prior art ‘without explaining to the court and to the other side … how these 
documents can be categorized as [prior art]’(Ibid para 83). The court further stated that 
Novartis, on the other hand, provided the points of distinction between the earlier patents 
relied upon as prior art and its own patent (Ibid). The court held that, ‘if [a] patent is valid, 
the defendant has failed to establish [a] prima facie credible defence and the case of 
infringement is made out by the patentee, the patentee may be entitled [to an] injunction’ 
(Ibid para 87).  
The court distinguished this case from that of Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd. v. Cipla Ltd where a 
credible challenge was raised to the validity of Roche’s patent by Cipla and it stated that 
‘Article 21 cannot be pressed into service by an infringer seeking to justify the infringement 
of a valid patent and the statutory rights conferred by the statute’ (Ibid paras 74, 89). The 
court further stated that if Cipla was ‘so very much concerned about the welfare of [the] 
public … and its grounds are genuine and correct, it could have filed [an] application for [the] 
grant of [a] Compulsory Licence’ (Ibid para 91). The implication of the court’s ruling in this 
case is that a generic drug company cannot rely on the right to health to justify the 
infringement of a valid pharmaceutical patent. If a generic drug company believes that the 
demand for a patented drug is not being met by the patentee or that the patentee is selling its 
drug at a price that is not reasonably affordable, the generic company can apply for a 
compulsory licence. 
The case of Natco v. Bayer is the first case in India in the post-TRIPS Agreement era where 
an applicant invoked the relevant provisions of the Indian Patents Act to seek the grant of a 
compulsory licence (Natco, 2012). The patentee in this case, Bayer, invented a drug called 
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‘Sorafenib’ and obtained an Indian patent for the drug in 2008. The drug is sold under the 
trade name ‘Nexavar’ and it is used for the treatment of kidney cancer and liver cancer. The 
applicant, Natco, an Indian generic drug manufacturer, had initially requested for a voluntary 
licence from Bayer to sell the drug at a cheaper price. Bayer did not grant this request and 
Natco subsequently applied for a compulsory licence. In granting Natco’s request for a 
compulsory licence, one of the issues considered by the Indian Controller of Patents was the 
price at which the drug was being sold in India. According to section 84(1)(b) of the Indian 
Patents Act of 2005, one of the grounds for the grant of a compulsory licence is that ‘the 
patented invention is not available to the public at a reasonably affordable price’. 
Natco argued that the price of the drug was ‘too high and simply unaffordable by the 
common man making the product inaccessible and out of reach’ (Ibid para 11).  According to 
Natco, a drug that costs Rs. 2,80,000 per month ‘will push a large proportion of the 
population into poverty’ (Ibid). In response, Bayer argued, inter alia, that ‘reasonable’ price 
must mean ‘reasonable’ to the public and the patentee as well, and that ‘the cost of R&D and 
the cost of manufacture, both have to be taken into account while determining “reasonable 
affordable price”’ (Ibid). 
In deciding to grant the compulsory licence, the Controller agreed that the drug, being sold at 
a price of Rs. 2,80,000 per month, was not reasonably affordable to members of the public 
(Ibid). The Controller disagreed with Bayer’s argument that ‘reasonable affordable price’ 
should be construed with reference to both the public and the patentee, and held that it has to 
be construed predominantly with reference to the public (Ibid). According to the terms of the 
compulsory licence granted to Natco by the Controller, Natco is meant to sell the drug at the 
price of Rs. 8880 per month (Ibid para 15). 
Bayer subsequently lodged an appeal against the decision of the Controller at the Indian 
Intellectual Property Appellate Board (IPAB). In March 2013, IPAB issued its final judgment 
and it dismissed Bayer’s appeal against the grant of the compulsory licence (Bayer, 2013). 
IPAB upheld the order of the Controller of Patents though it increased the rate of royalty to 
be paid by Natco to Bayer from 6% to 7% (Ibid para 54). In its final judgment, IPAB referred 
to section 83 of the Indian Patents Act which contains the general principles applicable to the 
working of patented inventions in India. Specifically, section 83(d) provides that patents 
should not impede the protection of public health. Section 83(g) further states that patents are 
granted to make the benefit of the patented invention available at reasonably affordable prices 
to the public. IPAB noted that it could not ‘ignore these markers’ in its decision (Ibid para 
22). 
IPAB’s final decision in this case indicates that it was mindful of the need to protect the right 
to health and the right to have access to medicines. In its judgment, reference was made to the 
Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health of 2001 (World Trade 
Organization Ministerial Declaration 2001). The Doha Declaration provides, inter alia, that 
the TRIPS Agreement ‘does not and should not prevent members from taking measures to 
protect public health … [and] that the Agreement can and should be interpreted and 
implemented in a manner supportive of WTO members’ right to protect public health and, in 
particular, to promote access to medicines for all’ (Ibid para 4). Importantly, IPAB noted that, 
under the Doha Declaration, countries ‘affirmed their full right to use the TRIPS flexibilities 
… especially in connection with [their] right to protect public health and in particular, to 
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promote access to medicines for all’ (Bayer, 2013, para 20). This led IPAB to the conclusion 
that the running theme is ‘public health and access to medicine, a facet of [the] right to life’ 
(Ibid). IPAB’s statement, that public health and access to medicine is a facet of the right to 
life, definitely implies an awareness on the part of IPAB that it was dealing with a matter that 
involved the right to health. 
IPAB further held that ‘the Controller was right in holding that the sales of the drug by the 
appellant at the price of about [Rs.] 280,000 … considering the purchasing capacity of the 
public … was not reasonably affordable to the public’ (Ibid para 44). IPAB’s decision was 
affirmed by the Bombay High Court in July 2014 (Bayer, Bombay High Court 2014) and 
Bayer’s subsequent petition to the Indian Supreme Court for a special leave to appeal against 
the judgment of the Bombay High Court was dismissed by the Supreme Court in December 
2014 (Bayer, Supreme Court of India 2014). 
 
CONCLUSION 
This chapter has shown that the courts in Kenya, South Africa, and India have interpreted the 
right to health to include an obligation on the state to provide/facilitate access to medicines. 
By incorporating the right to health into the adjudication of patent disputes, national courts in 
developing countries can play a crucial role in improving access to medicines at affordable 
prices. The incorporation of the right to health into the adjudication of disputes involving 
pharmaceutical patents does not necessarily imply that patent rights will no longer be 
recognized and respected, it only means that courts should not permit patent rights to be 
exercised and enforced in a manner that impedes access to medicines and the enjoyment of 
the right to health. 
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